China is North Korea’s most critical ally, largest trading partner, and primary supplier of food, weapons, and energy. Over the years, China has helped support the regime now led by Kim Jong-un and has generally resisted strong international sanctions against North Korea. Its main goal has been to prevent the collapse of the regime and avoid a potential flood of refugees across its border. However, after North Korea carried out its third nuclear test in February 2013, experts began to suggest that China’s tolerance for its neighbor was wearing thin. This test, which followed earlier ones in 2006 and 2009, has further strained North Korea’s ties with Beijing. China has long been involved in the Six Party Talks, a diplomatic effort aimed at ending North Korea’s nuclear program. Tensions rose again in December 2013 when Kim Jong-un ordered the execution of his uncle, Jang Song-taek, a key political figure with strong connections to China. That event raised new concerns in Beijing about the direction and stability of the North Korean leadership. Analysts also point to warming ties between China and South Korea as another factor that could shift the balance of power in the region and weaken the traditional bond between China and North Korea.
A Historic Alliance Under Stress
China’s backing of North Korea goes back to the Korean War (1950–1953), when Chinese troops entered the conflict to support their northern neighbor. Since then, China has continued to offer both political and economic support to North Korea's ruling family – Kim Il-sung (1912–1994), Kim Jong-il (1941–2011), and Kim Jong-un (1983–). However, cracks in the relationship started to show in October 2006, when North Korea carried out its first nuclear test. In response, China supported UN Security Council Resolution 1718, which introduced sanctions on Pyongyang. Along with earlier sanctions that followed North Korea’s missile tests in July 2006, this move marked a shift in China’s approach, from cooperative diplomacy to punitive action. China maintained this firmer stance after North Korea’s second nuclear test in May 2009.
Even so, China also maintained efforts to engage with North Korea. In October 2009, during a visit by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao to celebrate 60 years of diplomatic ties between the two countries, Beijing emphasized ongoing cooperation. But after Pyongyang's third nuclear test in February 2013, China responded more strongly. It summoned the North Korean ambassador, enforced new trade restrictions, scaled back energy supplies, and pushed again for denuclearization talks. Still, China did not use the same sharply critical language it had in 2006, when it called the first nuclear test “brazen.”
More recently, China voiced disapproval over a February 2014 United Nations report that detailed severe human rights abuses in North Korea, raising concerns about whether China would use its Security Council veto to block any international actions. Earlier, in March 2010, China chose not to condemn North Korea even after clear evidence showed Pyongyang was responsible for the sinking of a South Korean naval ship. However, during a June 2013 meeting with President Obama at Sunnylands, Chinese President Xi Jinping publicly backed calls for North Korea to denuclearize.
Still, even with China’s growing unease over North Korea’s unpredictable actions, it is unlikely to cut off its support completely. “The idea that the Chinese would turn their backs on the North Koreans is wrong,” says CFR Senior Fellow Adam Segal. After revisions softened the economic sanctions, China only agreed to UN Resolution 1718, limiting them to luxury items. Trade between the two countries has continued to rise. In 2013, bilateral trade increased by over ten percent from the previous year, reaching $6.5 billion. “There is no reason to think that political risks emanating from North Korea will lead China to withdraw its economic safety net for North Korea any time soon,” writes CFR Senior Fellow Scott Snyder.
Pyongyang's Gains
China provides North Korea with most of its food and energy, making up more than 60 percent of North Korea’s total trade. According to Nicholas Eberstadt, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, China has been North Korea’s main food supplier since the early 1990s and provides almost 90 percent of its energy imports. North Korea’s reliance on China continues to grow, as shown by the large trade imbalance. Many experts interpret the $1.25 billion trade gap as indirect support from China, since North Korea cannot access normal borrowing methods to cover the shortfall.
China also gives direct assistance to North Korea. “It is widely believed that Chinese food aid is channeled to the military,” wrote the Congressional Research Service in January 2010. This setup allows the World Food Program's food to go to the general public. At the same time, Chinese aid helps sustain the military, ensuring that foreign aid efforts don’t interfere with North Korea’s military-first approach or the regime’s stability.
“Washington believes in using pressure to influence North Korea to change its behavior, while Chinese diplomats and scholars have a much more negative view of sanctions and pressure tactics.“ – Daniel Pinkston, International Crisis Group.
China's Priorities
China has consistently viewed stability on the Korean Peninsula as one of its top priorities. Backing North Korea helps China maintain a friendly neighbor on its northeastern border and creates a buffer between itself and democratic South Korea, where roughly 29,000 U.S. troops and marines are stationed. Since Kim Jong-il’s death, South Korean policymakers have placed greater focus on preparing for potential instability in the North. Starting in June 2013, they began working to engage both U.S. and Chinese officials in more in-depth talks about possible future scenarios.
“For the Chinese, stability and the avoidance of war are the top priorities,” says Daniel Sneider, associate director for research at Stanford’s Asia-Pacific Research Center. The idea of a mass influx of North Korean refugees into China is a major concern for Beijing. “The Chinese are most concerned about the collapse of North Korea leading to chaos on the border,” says CFR’s Adam Segal.
Because of these concerns, China has often cautioned the international community not to pressure North Korea too heavily, fearing it could lead to the regime’s collapse. Refugees have already become a challenge for China, as its policy of sending North Koreans who cross the border back home has drawn strong criticism from human rights organizations. Jing-dong Yuan of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in California notes that in 2006, China started building a barbed-wire fence along the border to prepare for a possible refugee crisis.
Some analysts believe the Obama administration's strategic shift toward the Asia-Pacific – seen by some Chinese officials as a move to contain China – led to increased distrust between China and the U.S. regarding North Korea. China has tried to improve its ties with Seoul to counterbalance the close U.S.-South Korea alliance. In 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping and South Korean President Park Geun-hye completed an exchange of state visits within a year – a sign of significantly closer relations. This was especially notable, as Xi had yet to visit Pyongyang or meet with Kim Jong-un, making him the first Chinese leader to avoid direct engagement with North Korea’s current leader, according to Snyder. Still, despite growing trade between China and South Korea and plans for a bilateral free trade agreement by the end of that year, Snyder points out that the two countries do not fully align on strategic interests, which may slow the progress of their political relationship.
Experts also point out that China has shown uncertainty about whether it would intervene on North Korea’s behalf in the event of a conflict. The 1961 Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance technically commits China to defend North Korea against any unprovoked attack. However, Jaewoo Choo, a professor specializing in Chinese foreign policy at Kyung Hee University in South Korea, notes in Asian Survey that “China conceives itself to have the right to make an authoritative interpretation of the principle for intervention” outlined in the treaty. He adds that with shifting security dynamics since the end of the Cold War, “China now places more value on national interest, over alliances blinded by ideology.”
“For the Chinese, stability and the avoidance of war are the top priorities,” says Daniel Sneider, associate director for research at Stanford’s Asia-Pacific Research Center. “From that point of view, the North Koreans are a huge problem for them, because Pyongyang could trigger a war on its own.” One of China’s biggest concerns is the possibility of hundreds of thousands of North Korean refugees pouring across the border. “The Chinese are most concerned about the collapse of North Korea leading to chaos on the border,” adds CFR’s Adam Segal.
If a conflict were to break out between North Korea and the United States, both China and South Korea would likely suffer the most from the resulting military crisis. Still, both countries have been cautious in how they handle North Korea, worried that applying too much pressure could cause the regime under Kim Jong-un to collapse. China is already dealing with the refugee issue. It has committed to returning North Koreans who cross the border illegally, but doing so has led to harsh criticism from human rights organizations. Jing-dong Yuan of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in California notes that 2006, China began building a barbed wire fence along the border to help prevent a potential refugee crisis.
Experts say that China has shown uncertainty about its willingness to defend North Korea if war breaks out. According to the 1961 Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, China is expected to defend North Korea if it faces an unprovoked attack. However, Jaewoo Choo, an assistant professor of Chinese foreign policy at Kyung Hee University in South Korea, explains in Asian Survey that “China conceives itself to have the right to make an authoritative interpretation of the ‘principle for intervention’ in the treaty.” He argues that since the end of the Cold War, China has shifted its focus toward protecting its national interests over sticking with alliances based purely on ideology. Even so, this uncertainty about China’s position is a deterrent, making other countries hesitant to take military action against Pyongyang.
Beijing's Leverage
Since September 2013, China has been unable to restart the Six Party Talks to enforce the 2005 joint agreement on denuclearization. The U.S. relies heavily on China’s influence to push North Korea back to the negotiating table. Washington also works with Beijing at the UN Security Council to impose penalties on North Korea for its ongoing nuclear weapons and missile development. China's status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council gives it the power to block any proposed actions targeting North Korea. “It’s clear that the Chinese have enormous leverage over North Korea in many respects,” Daniel Sneider of Stanford’s Asia-Pacific Research Center says. “But can China actually try to exercise that influence without destabilizing the regime? Probably not.”
Analysts suggest that with the elimination of Jang Song-taek – once a key link between Pyongyang and Beijing – China may lean more heavily on preserving stability rather than focusing on denuclearization in the short term. At the same time, his removal may limit China’s strategic options to work more closely with the United States and South Korea, especially given what Snyder refers to as the “skyrocketing reputational costs” of maintaining strong ties with North Korea’s leadership.
Washington's Role
The U.S. has long pressured North Korea to completely abandon its nuclear weapons program in exchange for aid, diplomatic recognition, and improved ties with Washington. However, experts say that the U.S. and China view this issue differently. “Washington believes in using pressure to influence North Korea to change its behavior, while Chinese diplomats and scholars have a much more negative view of sanctions and pressure tactics,” says Daniel Pinkston of the International Crisis Group. “They tend to see public measures as humiliating and counterproductive.”
At the start of President Obama’s first term in 2009, there were hopes for direct talks between Washington and Pyongyang. However, North Korea’s continued missile tests quickly dampened those expectations. The U.S. then adopted what Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described as a “strategic patience” policy developed in close cooperation with allies from the Six Party Talks. “This emphasis on alliance coordination has been the first principle of any Obama administration discussion of policy toward North Korea,” Snyder notes. The Obama administration engaged in several rounds of direct dialogue with Pyongyang in 2011. However, after both countries issued statements in February 2012 – known as the Leap Day agreement – North Korea soon announced plans to test a multi-stage rocket, which failed to put a satellite into orbit on April 12, 2012.
This approach came under pressure following the Obama administration’s 2011 “pivot” to Asia, a strategy designed to increase U.S. influence across political, economic, and military fronts. This shift, Snyder writes, “provides a backdrop to consider prospects for Sino-U.S. cooperation on policies toward North Korea, and highlights Chinese wariness and strategic mistrust of U.S. policy intentions.” Some critics have also questioned Washington’s long-term commitment to the region, arguing that denuclearization and stability on the Korean Peninsula have taken a back seat in recent years.
"Without a more candid conversation among Beijing, Seoul, and Washington, the latent risk of an acute threat on the peninsula remains uncomfortably high." – Jonathan D. Pollack, Brookings Institute.
Looking Forward
“Everyone who deals with North Korea recognizes [it] as a very unstable actor,” says Sneider. Still, some analysts argue that North Korea’s growing boldness with China and in international affairs reflects a deliberate strategy. “The North Koreans are developing a much more realist approach to their foreign policy,” says Pinkston. Although China is frustrated by Pyongyang’s nuclear threats, most experts agree that Beijing is unlikely to take any action that could lead to the sudden collapse of the North Korean regime.
A report released in January 2008 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the U.S. Institute of Peace reveals that China has prepared its contingency plans (PDF) in case instability erupts in North Korea. According to the report, Chinese forces could be deployed to maintain order if unrest leads to widespread violence or threatens key sites like nuclear facilities.
Ongoing policy challenges have lowered expectations for reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula. “Without a more candid conversation among Beijing, Seoul, and Washington, the latent risk of an acute threat on the peninsula remains uncomfortably high,” writes Jonathan D. Pollack, director of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution.
Mary Watson
